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Croatia secured its state independence during the turbulent collapse of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička Federativna Republika 
Jugoslavija - SFRJ) from 1990 to 1992 under exceptionally complex interna-
tional circumstances. The world’s most influential countries, first and fore-
most the United States, upheld the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia 
despite clear indications of its violent break-up.1 After the democratic chang-
es of 1990, an exceptionally important matter for Croatia’s independence was 
the internationalization of the Yugoslav crisis. The unraveling of the Yugoslav 
state union dictated a redefinition of the status of the republics as its constitu-
ent units; in this process, in line with national homogenization which consti-
tuted the dominant component of societal transition at the time, the question 
of redefining national identities came to the forefront. The problem of pre-
senting Croatia as a self-contained geopolitical unit, entailing arguments that 
should accompany its quest for state independence, imposed itself in this con-
text. Political proclamations in the country, media presentation and lobbying 
associated with the problem of becoming acquainted with the political cul-
tures and establishments of influential countries and the functioning of inter-
national institutions became the priorities for newly-emerging Croatian diplo-
macy. What is Croatia? What does it want? How should it present itself to the 
international public? How should it achieve its objectives?
In this work, this matter is examined in the context of Croatia’s affirmation 
in the United States, based above all on the views of members of the Croatian 
American intelligentsia who became involved in this political discourse with 
their observations in the Croatian media (the newsmagazines Danas and 
Globus). What follows is a selective overview of the most important events in 
 * Albert Bing, Ph. D., Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb, Croatia
1 David Binder, “Evolution in Europe; Yugoslavia seen breaking up soon,” The New York 
Times, 28 Nov. 1990. Reference to information from this article can be found in the Croatian 
press as well; see, for example: Mirko Galić, “Ni rat ni mir”, Danas, 12 Feb. 1991.
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the establishment of Croatian-U.S. relations is provided for the period begin-
ning with the first more or less independent Croatian ventures onto the inter-
national scene in the second half of 1990 until recognition of the Croatian 
state by the United States in April 1992; relevant events from later periods and 
their interpretation are only provided exceptionally.
Croatian émigré communities played a unique role in the promotion of polit-
ical pluralism, securing of independence and the resistance to Greater Serbian 
aggression. From a distance of fifteen years after the beginning of Croatia’s 
Homeland War and the achievement of independence, the first historiograph-
ic considerations of this matter indicate the need to analyze and contextual-
ize the problem of Croatia’s position in the international community given the 
contributions of Croatian émigrés to this process. One of the most intrigu-
ing questions in this context pertains to the role of the Croatian émigré intel-
ligentsia. Were Croatian intellectuals abroad, particularly in countries with a 
great deal of influence on the course of the Yugoslavia crisis, like the United 
States, adequately employed at crucial moments during Croatia’s appearance 
on the international stage? What was the attitude of the Croatian authorities, 
and what was the attitude of the intelligentsia? What problems were generat-
ed in the process of Croatia’s international affirmation and what was the cor-
relation between the processes of democratization in Croatian society and the 
approach to associations and processes in which Croatia wished to partici-
pate?
The public statements of a target group of highly-educated intellectuals, 
generally Ph.Ds and university professors from the United States, were taken 
as the reference framework for an initial attempt to illuminate this research 
question. Individuals such as Vladimir P. Goss, Ivo Banac, Tomislav Sunić, 
Mate Meštrović, Petar Kuzmić, Jerry Blaskovich, and others constitute a cross-
section of Croatian Americans who were witnesses and chroniclers of the 
momentous years of Croatian history at the beginning of the 1990s. Although 
they differ in their political affinities and orientations, they contributed to the 
analysis and critical observation of events in Croatia and, particularly, in the 
international reception of events associated with Yugoslavia’s collapse. Many 
of them even opted to return to Croatia and become actively involved in polit-
ical life. 
The research motives postulated here pertain to several essential prob-
lems of Croatia’s affirmation in the international community at two basic lev-
els: the first deals with the genesis of Croatia’s institutional appearances in the 
international community as a an independent political entity, and the second 
deals with the problem of adopting the value systems of liberal democracy 
and attempts to become integrated with its most eminent manifestations (the 
developed West; Euro-Atlantic integration).
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Croatia and the United States, 1990/1992
A joke was circulating in the capital of Zagreb at the end of the 1980s that 
illustrated the political preferences of many residents of Croatia (Yugoslavia):
What color will the Sava River be if the Russians attack us?
Red. From our blood, because we’ll defend ourselves.
What color will the Sava River be if the Americans attack us?
Red again. From our (red) communist party membership booklets.
As the world’s ‘top democracy’ and the only remaining superpower after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States played a major role in the 
formation of the political consciousness and reception of the West in Croatia 
and Yugoslavia, which in turn had particular significance in the tumultuous 
years of the Yugoslav crisis in 1990 and 1991. Pro-democratic political groups 
expected the active support of the United States in the turbulent process of 
society-wide transition. At the same time, the political bloc backed by Serbian 
strongman Slobodan Milošević, especially the top officers of the Yugoslav 
People’s Army (Jugoslavenska narodna armija - JNA), feared any response by 
the U.S.
Immediately after the democratic elections in Croatia and Slovenia, 
in the spring of 1990, the newly-elected authorities of these republics 
tried to draw the attention of the United States on an independent basis, 
presenting themselves as pro-democratic political options, as opposed 
to Milošević’s nationalist/communist movement. At the end of 1990, 
Croatian President Franjo Tuđman traveled to the United States.2 Even 
though this visit had a practically marginal impact on Croatian-U.S. 
political relations (until Croatia’s international recognition, political 
legitimacy was borne by the SFRJ which was unwaveringly supported by 
the U.S.), the public in Croatia and Yugoslavia was informed thereof in 
excessively optimistic tones, which clearly indicated the instigation of a 
propaganda war. The Croatian media, under the influence of the author-
ities, exaggerated the impact of the “state” visit of the Croatian delega-
tion, led by Tuđman, to the White House; thus the press, through the 
national wire agency HINA, reported that “Dr. Tuđman (...) informed 
President Bush of the situation in Croatia and Yugoslavia.”3 According 
to Slaven Letica, who was a member of that Croatian delegation, the 
meeting between Tuđman and Bush lasted less than two minutes and 
consisted of “handshakes” and “photographs.”4
2 “Dr. Tuđman doputovao u New York”, HINA, 21 Sept. 1990; “Predsjednik Tuđman održao 
predavanje na sveučilištu Yale”, HINA, 21 Sept. 1990; “Dr. Tuđman razgovarao s američkim kon-
gresmenima”, HINA, 25 Sept. 1990; “Dr. Tuđman se vratio u domovinu”, HINA, 2 Oct. 1990; 
“Potpisana izjava o suradnji Hrvatske i Minnesote”, HINA, 14 Dec. 1990.
3 See: “Bushov susret s Tuđmanom, Izvatci iz tiska,” Miroslav Krmpotić, ed. Kronologija rata 
Hrvatska i Bosna Hercegovina (Zagreb: Hrvatski informativni centar/Slovo, 1998), p. 30.
4 Slaven Letica, “Javni apel Mesiću i Račanu: Molim vas da priupitate predsjednika Clintona za 
fonograme Tuđmanovih i mojih razgovora u Bijeloj kući iz rujna 1990!,” Globus, 11 Aug. 2000. 
There are other account of this event. In his memoirs published a decade later, one of the most 
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Nonetheless, the “Croatian question” attracted some limited attention by the 
U.S. government. The Croatian delegation did manage to hold a brief meet-
ing with National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, to whom it presented 
the “confederation project” for Yugoslavia and sought his support “to imple-
ment the idea of transforming the former SFRJ into an alliance of indepen-
dent, sovereign, democratic states.”5 As noted by Slaven Letica, who together 
with Darko Bekić, was one of the lead associates on this project, together with 
“about thirty top Croatian economists, geo-strategists, military experts, geog-
raphers, political scientists, historians, lawyers, theologians and others,” the 
project was the result of “over three months” of studious work. This fact tes-
tifies to the importance placed at that time by the Croatian authorities on the 
visit to the United States and the confederalization of Yugoslavia. The project 
itself was “positively reviewed by leading constitutional and international law 
experts at Yale University,” certainly thanks to two of its professors of Croatian 
descent , Mirjan Damaška and Ivo Banac, who organized a lecture at Yale by 
Tuđman.6
Even though the meeting between Tuđman and Bush was symbolic in nature, 
and the Draft Confederation Agreement was “rejected by the Bush administra-
tion as unacceptable,” Croatia’s attempts were not entirely without effect. The 
U.S. did not officially endorse Croatia’s positions, but the well-known organi-
zation Human Rights Watch sided with Croatian and Slovenian projections of 
the outcome of the Yugoslav crisis in the influential The New York Times.7 At 
the very beginnings of Croatia’s international affirmation in 1990, it became 
obvious that bringing Croatia’s positions closer to the U.S. was one of the pri-
orities of Croatian foreign policy, and the role of the Croatian intelligentsia in 
the United States (and among émigré communities as a whole) was welcomed 
in the top echelons of the Croatian government.
At the end of 1991, when the leadership of the JNA threatened a mili-
tary coup, President Tuđman responded by sending a letter to U.S. President 
George Bush. Although the significance of this act, similar to Tuđman’s meet-
ing with Bush, was over-exaggerated when presented to the Croatian public, 
respected Croatian Americans, Mate Meštrović, described this event as “an unpleasant incident 
when Franjo Tuđman waited in the corridor of the White House in the hopes of meeting with 
Bush, but the latter simply rushed past him barely waving his hand, without even knowing who 
he was.” According to Meštrović “Tuđman insisted on this alleged meeting because he wanted 
to show the public in Croatia that the U.S. president supports him,” and “because of this attempt 
to at least be photographed with Bush, Tuđman was ridiculed in the Serbian media for days.” 
See: Mate Meštrović, U vrtlogu hrvatske politike – kazivanje Peri Zlataru (Zagreb: Golden mar-
keting, 2003), p. 276. See also: Mario Nobilo, Hrvatski Feniks, Diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih 
vrata 1990.-1997. (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 2000), p.147.
5 Slaven Letica, “Javni apel Mesiću i Račanu: Molim vas da priupitate predsjednika Clintona 
za fonograme Tuđmanovih i mojih razgovora u Bijeloj kući iz rujna 1990!,” Globus, 11 Aug. 
2000.
6 Ibid.
7 Jeri Laber and Kenneth Anderson, “Why Keep Yugoslavia One Country,” The New York 
Times, 10 Oct. 1990.
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it did articulate Croatia’s positions.8 In this letter, which was supposed to be 
delivered through the mediation of U.S. Senator Robert Dole, the Croatian 
president publicly sought American endorsement of a peaceful settlement of 
the Yugoslav crisis that would guarantee future stability, respect for internal 
borders and cooperation between the national states. Tuđman emphasized 
that the “path to stability has only one direction, and that is the success of 
democratic society. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia 
have elected democratic governments. The election of the Marxist communist 
Slobodan Milošević cannot be compared to the democratically elected gov-
ernments in the north.”9 In his message the Croatian president did not con-
ceal his expectation of direct support from the United States: “A disaster in 
Yugoslavia can be prevented by an explicit message from the United States of 
America that it supports the majority, meaning the newly-established demo-
cratic republics, calling on a peaceful solution to secure future stability and to 
respect internal borders and ensure cooperation between the national states. 
Yugoslavia is not the Soviet Union; Serbia is not Russia; the Yugoslav Army is 
not the Soviet Army.”10
Although it was apparent that Washington did not endorse the separatism 
of Slovenia and Croatia, by the same token it was more than obvious that it 
was not pleased with the interference of the JNA in politics, particularly the 
increasing affinity of the top military leadership for Milošević’s regime. In 
December 1990, the United States sharply condemned the saber-rattling in 
Belgrade. In his memoirs, U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann stated that 
the putschist statements of Defense Minister Veljko Kadijević had aroused 
“deep concern” in Washington. Kadijević, in fact, addressed the Yugoslav pub-
lic immediately before the elections in Serbia on 9 December 1990; “in a press 
interview clearly designed to help Milošević at the polls, he threatened to use 
the JNA to disarm the Croats and Slovenes by force.”11
The U.S. attitude provoked a revolt by the military leadership. Thus 
Kadijević notes that “it was known (...) that all activities by western embassies 
in Belgrade were coordinated by Mr. Zimmermann”; he will “be remembered 
as a man who bears great responsibility for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and 
8 On this see: Davor Glavaš, “Jovićeva ucjena Bushom,” Danas, 5 Mar. 1991. A similar assess-
ment of policies aimed at “propaganda effects,” such as the letter to George Bush, was made 
thirteen years later by Višnja Starešina: “Croatia’s foreign policy initiatives from Zagreb were 
also very specific. Franjo Tuđman liked to write letters to international statesmen, which would 
then be published in Croatian newspapers and read on Croatian Television. Thus the Croatian 
public was given the impression of a vigorous foreign policy. Nobody else shared this impres-
sion. For example, while European monitors, who could have conveyed these messages to their 
governments, were ignored by the Croatian authorities and the Croatian leadership attempt-
ed to convey messages to them by means of domestic television broadcasts.” Višnja Starešina, 
Vježbe u laboratoriju Balkan (Zagreb: 2004), p. 80.
9 Tuđman’s letter is printed in its entirety in Slaven Letica and Mario Nobilo, Rat protiv 
Hrvatske-KOS-tajni dokumenti (Zagreb: Posebna izdanja Globusa, 1991), p. 86.
10 Ibid., 86.
11 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe (Times Books: New York, 1996), p. 96.
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great responsibility for much bloodshed in Yugoslavia.”12 Verbal attacks on the 
U.S. embassy included orchestrated accusations made by the Serbian press 
about anti-Yugoslav activities, so that they even claimed that Zimmermann 
was certainly a CIA operative.13 The newly-formed political party called the 
Communist Alliance/Movement for Yugoslavia went the farthest, as it called 
for the deportation of U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann at its annual 
convention.14
The denunciation of Zimmermann in Belgrade was not only excessive, it 
was entirely misplaced given his (American) standpoints. The U.S. ambas-
sador was certainly no admirer of Milošević’s policies, but he similarly did 
not support the Slovenian nor, especially, the Croatian divergence from 
the Yugoslav option upheld by Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković. For 
Zimmermann, “Slovenian nationalism was unique - it had no victims and no 
enemies”; although the Slovenes “hated Slobodan Milošević, they built no ide-
ology against him. They practiced a ‘Garbo’ nationalism – they just wanted 
to be left alone. Their virtue was democracy and their vice was selfishness.”15 
As for Croatia, Zimmermann, in his own words, “avoided” meeting with 
Tuđman prior to his electoral victory “because of the extreme nationalism of 
some of his campaign statements.”16 For Zimmermann, Tuđman, as opposed 
to Milošević “who was driven by power,” “betrayed an obsession with Croatian 
nationalism”: “his devotion to Croatia was of the most narrow-minded sort, 
and he never showed much understanding of, or interest in, democratic val-
ues.”17 Zimmermann readily rejected the Croatian president’s requests for U.S. 
intervention and military assistance.18
Nonetheless, given Yugoslavia’s complex circumstances, U.S. support for 
Ante Marković proved entirely erroneous. When the U.S. Secretary of State 
James Baker visited Belgrade on 21 June 1991, his support to the Yugoslav 
prime minister and the preservation of Yugoslavia’s unity was interpreted as a 
green light for intervention in Slovenia by the JNA, after which war broke out 
in Croatia.19 Upon the arrival of representatives of the European Community 
with the goal of extinguishing the Yugoslavia crisis, the United States left the 
entire matter in the hands of Europe, falling back on some form of neo-isola-
tionism.20
12 Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada (Belgrade: Politika, izdavačka delatnost,  1993), p. 21.
13 See: Politika Ekspres, 18 Feb. 1991, cited in: V. P. Gagnon, Jr., “Yugoslavia: Prospects for the 
Stability”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 70., No 3., Summer 1991, 25.
14 Večernji list, 2 Feb. 1991.
15 Warren Zimmermann, Origins..., 71.
16 Ibid., 71.
17 Ibid., 75. Zimmermann was the first in a series of U.S. officials (Peter Galbraith, Madeleine 
Albright) to have a particularly low opinion of the Croatian president because of his lack of 
political sensibility for democratic values.
18 Warren Zimmermann, Origins…, p. 95.
19 Janez Janša, Pomaci-Nastajanje i obrana slovenske države 1988-1992 (Zagreb: Mladinska 
knjiga, 1993), p. 83.
20 On this see: Laura Silber & Allan Little, Smrt Jugoslavije (Opatija: Otokar Keršovani, 1996), 
pp. 139-164. See also the first episode of the television series of the same name.
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By proclaiming independence on 25 June 1991, Croatia, together with 
Slovenia, made public its separation from the Yugoslav federation despite 
repeated warnings not to do so from the world’s most powerful country. 
Under such circumstances it was certainly impossible to develop bilateral rela-
tions, and the “insubordination” demonstrated by Croatia and Slovenia could 
be interpreted as an additional motive for U.S. withdrawal from the Yugoslav 
crisis and relinquishing its settlement to the European Community. When the 
twelve member states of the European Community recognized Croatia and 
Slovenia six months later, the U.S. remained silent. Recognition by the U.S. 
would come several months later – on 7 April 1992, while a U.S. embassy in 
Zagreb was only opened on 28 June 1993. During 1994, after the genocidal mis-
sion of Serbia and Montenegro in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United 
States once more became actively involved in the Balkan war zone, which cul-
minated at the end of 1995 with the ‘Pax Americana’ signed in Dayton, Ohio 
and, ultimately, the military intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
in 1999, which lead to peace and stabilization in the region.
Just as the United States played the most important role in the end-game of 
the “Yugoslav crisis” in the second half of the 1990s, at the beginning of this 
crisis, in 1990 and 1991, its passivity contributed to its flare-up. While dem-
ocratically oriented Slovenia and Croatia idealized the American devotion to 
democracy and nurtured unrealistic expectations of the U.S., Milošević and 
the JNA, in equal measure, feared U.S. intervention.
Croatian Americans also participated in Croatian media assessments of 
the interpretation of U.S. policies concerning events tied to the collapse of 
Yugoslavia. Thus in his “View from America” (the title of his column in the 
newsmagazine Danas), one of the most respected pro-democratic émigrés, 
Mate Meštrović, tried to explain the tenets underlying U.S. foreign policy at 
the time of the JNA assault on Slovenia and the worsening situation in Croatia 
(the end of July and the beginning of August 1991). The passive attitude of the 
United States confused the public in Croatia and Slovenia, which expected sup-
port from the world’s ‘first democracy’ in the conflict between the democratic 
northwest and the nationalist-communism of the Milošević bloc. About this, 
Meštrović wrote: “This has to do with the contradictory American self-image: 
the confrontation between egoism and idealism. As the leading superpower, 
the United States longs for world domination, which it often achieves through 
restraint, even though sometimes it is prepared to affirm itself by means of 
merciless war, as recently demonstrated in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, 
the United States believes that it is ‘the land of the free and home of the brave,’ 
the leading world democracy and capitalist economy whose manifest destiny 
is to promote the interests of democracy and capitalism worldwide.”21
21 Mate MEŠTROVIĆ, “Zapad u šoku,” Danas, 9 July 1991. This dichotomy in U.S. foreign pol-
icy – the tension between pragmatism and principle – has been examined by many authors; thus 
Peter Scowen stresses that the U.S. has always struck a balance between “instinctive isolationism” 
and the conviction of its own “heroic superiority” and international mission as the “defender of 
freedom.” Peter Scowen, Crna knjiga Amerike (Zagreb: Izvori, 2003), pp. 221-223. These issues 
of “contradictory foreign policy stances” were also covered by Henry Kissinger in his contem-
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Meštrović goes on to talk about aspects of American policy, which were par-
ticularly significant to the question of legitimizing Croatia in the international 
community in the context of the Yugoslav conflicts: “As part of the affirmation 
of democracy, a crucial aspect is support for the principle of self-determina-
tion of nations, which was proclaimed in 1917 by President Woodrow Wilson 
in his famous 14 Points, as one of the foundations of lasting and just peace in 
the world. The conflict between the United States as a superpower engaged in 
realpolitik to further its own strategic, military and economic interests (even 
though there is some disagreement in the United States as to what these inter-
ests actually are), and America as the torch-bearer of freedom, democracy 
and human rights, incorporated even in the policies that Washington imple-
mented in Yugoslavia, creates constant tensions and contradictions. The State 
Department stubbornly insisted on preserving the unity and territorial integ-
rity of Yugoslavia, which it believes is an ‘interest’ of the United States, while at 
the same time it demands respect for democracy and human rights, and estab-
lishment of the rule of law and a market economy.22
In the spring of 1992, writing for the newsmagazine Globus, historian Ivo 
Banac caustically summarized U.S. policy at the beginning of the 1990s in 
the territory of the then already former Yugoslavia: “The United States actu-
ally has no specific Yugoslav policy. It goes without saying that the superfi-
cial nature and cynicism of U.S. policy, obsessed with Yugoslavia as an inte-
gral state, ignoring the centrifugal force of national movements and post-com-
munism in general, revering the golden calf of ‘stability’ with Ante Marković 
playing the role of Bush’s beloved Gorbachev, and relying on the ‘Yugo-exper-
tise’ of certain key officials in the Bush administration, have contributed to 
expansion of the conflict, legitimization of the unconstitutional pretensions of 
the JNA, marginalization of anti-imperialist forces in Serbia and Montenegro, 
and the bloodshed and aggression in Croatia. This is the bottom line of Bush’s 
opportunistic policy. If opportunism, in the positive sense, means adaptation 
to newly-emerging conditions, then the Bush administration has fallen short 
even in its principles. The fact that these virtual dwarves are now administer-
ing foreign policy in what is now the world’s sole superpower is actually unbe-
lievable.”23
The criticism of Petar Kuzmić, a theology professor from Boston, carried in 
the weekly Danas after the “tragically late” U.S. recognition of Croatia (7 April 
1992), was no less biting. Emphasizing that U.S. recognition “greatly improves 
Croatia’s standing on the international scene” and observing that it will be fol-
lowed by “an avalanche of recognition from many countries for which America 
serves as a reliable weather-vane,” Kuzmić also made the following point: “A 
plation of the redefinition of U.S. national interests in the “multipolar world of the twenty-first 
century.” See: Henry Kissinger, Diplomacija (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2000), p. 272.
22 Mate Meštrović, “Zapad u šoku,” Danas, 9 July 1991.
23 Ivo Banac, “Američki patuljci spašavaju Jugoslaviju!,” Globus, 6 Mar. 1992.
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bitter feeling remains over the fact that the Americans waited so long, unreal-
istically insisting on a peaceful and comprehensive solution to the Yugo-cri-
sis, and their inconsistency in their own principles and their apparently hypo-
critical and indifferent policies means that they share in the responsibility for 
many victims.”24
All of the contributions by Croatian American intellectuals commenting 
on events in Croatia and Yugoslavia from the “dual” Croatian-American per-
spective are characterized by outright, harsh criticism of official U.S. poli-
cy. However, the Croatian government’s foreign policy was not spared in this 
regard, either.
Two fundamental historical processes crystallized in Croatia in 1990 and 
1991 under wartime conditions: the political affirmation of Croatia’s indepen-
dence in the international community and the gradual change of the social sys-
tem as a result of the introduction of political pluralism. Even though the stance 
of a superpower like the United States could hardly be altered by the Croatian 
government—the leadership of a small emerging state beset by war—the pol-
icies conducted by its top officials in this vital period often left much to be 
desired. As observed by well-informed journalist and writer Višnja Starešina, 
“the three most important forms of creating perceptions of the war in Croatia 
were left to chance and private initiative: the relationship with the foreign 
media, the relationship with European monitors and political lobbying. Even 
diplomacy was just being created, in a very peculiar manner at that.”25 Thus, 
for example, during 1992, a course on public relations (with focus on the U.S. 
and Canada) was held at the initiative of Assistant Information Minister Ante 
Beljo (himself a returning émigré from Canada) for the staff of the Croatian 
Information Center in Zagreb. Lecturer Laurie Vandriel stressed simplicity as 
an axiom in communicating with the U.S., expressing the principle in the witty 
acronym ‘KISS’ (“Keep it simple, stupid”). Vandriel’s offer to conduct system-
atic training of Croatian officials in the relevant institutions was not accepted, 
even though it was quite obvious that Croatia’s culture of political communi-
cation with foreign countries was not satisfactory.
However, events in Croatia and the former Yugoslavia during 1991 and 
1992 proceeded at an exceptional pace. Croatian-U.S. relations can also be 
examined in this historical context, as these relations increasingly slid to the 
peripheries of Croatia’s foreign policy interests since the U.S. left the Yugoslav 
crisis in the hands of the European Community in the second half of 1991. 
To be sure, the problem of Croatia’s independence and its international affir-
mation, as well as a series of matters tied to democratization of Croatian soci-
ety, were the subject of observation (and political involvement) by Croatian 
Americans.
24 Petar Kuzmić, “Zahvalnost bez oduševljenja,” Danas, 14 Apr. 1992.
25 Višnja Starešina, op. cit., 68.
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Croatian diplomatic activity in the United States in 1990-1992 and 
critical observations by the Croatian-American intelligentsia
The steps taken by Croatia to prepare for its declaration of its independence, 
particularly in the international sphere, were generally symbolic. The socialist 
institution of chairman of the Republic Foreign Relations Committee, an office 
held by Zdravko Mršić after the elections, followed by Frane Vinko Golem, 
was transformed by decision of the Croatian Parliament on 20 June 1990 into 
the appropriate ministry (and the presiding member of the Presidency became 
the President of the Republic, the Executive Council became the Government 
as the highest executive body, and the remaining secretariats and committees 
were transformed into ministries, and so forth). However, the process of insti-
tutional transformation that stressed republic (state) sovereignty and the aspi-
ration for independence proceeded much more slowly than in Slovenia; while 
Croatia demonstrated its international aspirations by establishing associations 
such as the Croatian Council of the European Movement, on the same day 
(23 June 1990) Slovenia released its new draft Constitution which was sup-
posed to be a step toward state independence within the proposed confeder-
al reorganization of Yugoslavia. Following Slovenia’s example, on 18 January 
1991, President Tuđman decided to establish Foreign Offices of the Republic 
of Croatia, which were supposed to facilitate more independent activity by 
Croatia abroad. Over the coming months, such Republic of Croatia offices 
were established in major European cities, in the United States and Canada, 
and in South Africa and Japan.26
The practice of opening offices abroad did not violate the Yugoslav 
Constitution nor did diplomacy at the federal level have any specific opposi-
tion thereto. Yugoslavia’s foreign missions included, besides embassies, con-
sular offices and culture and information centers. The visit by Croatia’s first 
foreign minister, Zdravko Mršić, to New York in the autumn of 1990 was par-
tially organized by the Culture and Information Center in that city, just as 
Yugoslav diplomatic institutions assisted the travel of Bosnian President Alija 
Izetbegović to Iran and Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov to Canada and 
the United States. Under conditions of increasingly tense relations between 
the republics in Yugoslavia, the expansion of a network of foreign offices cer-
tainly contributed to reinforcement of the position of individual republics in 
internationalizing the Yugoslav crisis.27
A decision of the Supreme State Council on 9 April 1991 led to establish-
ment of the Republic of Croatia Foreign Office in Washington, D.C. (it com-
menced operating on 8 July). The foreign minister at the time, Frane Vinko 
26 On this see: Davor Glavaš, “Raskršća Jugo-diplomacije,” Danas, 14 May 1991.
27 It would be wrong conclude that the option of international affirmation was only exploit-
ed by Slovenia and Croatia. This practice was initiated by the Socialist Republic of Serbia, 
whose representative Aleksandar Prlja virtually functioned as Serbia’s foreign minister abroad 
before Slovenia and Croatia even held elections to change their governments. See for example: 
“Sudbina Jugoslavije nije vezana ni za jednu partiju- Prenosimo: Intervju Slobodana Miloševića 
američkom Njuzviku,” Borba, 1 Feb. 1990.
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Golem, was appointed to head the office as the fully authorized represen-
tative of the Republic of Croatia in the United States. As the Croatian for-
eign office in Washington began functioning, Croatia was preparing (in an 
effort to keep pace with Slovenia) to declare its independence. The individu-
als most responsible for foreign relations, President Franjo Tuđman and the 
new Foreign Minister Davorin Rudolf, placed their highest hopes in help from 
the United States.28 On the eve of the visit by U.S. Secretary of State James 
Baker to Belgrade in June 1991, news arrived that Germany’s Bundestag rati-
fied a draft declaration on Yugoslavia that stressed the constitutional right of 
Yugoslav republics to self-determination and secession. According to later tes-
timony by Rudolf, who was traveling with the president to meet with Baker on 
21 June, Tuđman was emboldened by the news from Germany, and very opti-
mistic in his expectations of U.S. support.
Even though the United States announced its support for the autonomy of 
the Yugoslav republics provided that the country’s unity was preserved as a 
“major turnaround” on the eve of the visit by the Secretary of State, Tuđman was 
convinced that the U.S. would support Croatia’s decision to declare indepen-
dence and, moreover, he “claimed (...) that it would provide armed support.”29 
Although more restrained, even Rudolf did not conceal that he had expected 
the most support from the United States: “I always placed an absolute priori-
ty on relations with the Americans. I was convinced that only they were capa-
ble of saving a young state from eradication, a state fighting against consider-
ably stronger opponents.”30 The emphasis that the Croatian leadership, espe-
cially the Croatian president, placed on the “American card” in the spring of 
1991 is also demonstrated by Tuđman’s personal offer to the Democratic sen-
ator and former Minnesota governor, Rudy Perpich, an American of Croatian 
descent, to assume the duties of Croatian foreign minister from Frane Vinko 
Golem.31 Even though the appointment of Perpich came to naught, and Rudolf 
became the minister, the United States was still highly regarded by Zagreb in 
its attempts to attract the attention of the international community.
However, the reality of relations between Croatia and the United States was 
quite different. The actual steps taken by Croatia in the United States were 
based more on rhetoric about Croatia’s place in the West than on practical 
steps to set the foundations for effective lobbying. As noted in his subsequent 
writings by President Tuđman’s advisor at the time, Mario Nobilo, summa-
rizing Croatia’s official relations with the U.S. at the beginning of the 1990s: 
“Croatia did not, unfortunately, place sufficient emphasis on publicity in New 
York and throughout North America, even though the role of the United 
Nations and the U.S. was crucial to resolving the crisis. The Croatian author-
ities were more obsessed with the status symbols of hard-won independence 
28 Davorin Rudolf held the post of foreign minister from 3 May 1991 to 31 July 1991.
29 Davorin Rudolf, Rat koji nismo htjeli (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 1999), p. 250.
30 Ibid., 250.
31 Krešo Špeletić, “Guverner kao ministar,” Danas, 16 Apr. 1991. An opposing candidate was 
respected maritime law expert Hrvoje Kačić.
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rather than on deployment of resources to end the war and facilitate recon-
struction.”32 Nobilo’s assessment is reflected in the reminiscences of officials of 
the time, and in numerous articles in the media and other publications.
Judging by available sources, including the observations of Croatian 
Americans, something of a paradigm for emerging Croatian foreign policy 
in 1991 and 1992 was encapsulated in the activities of Frane Vinko Golem, 
first as foreign minister and then as Croatia’s authorized representative in the 
United States. Even though it is possible to find a few laudatory evaluations 
of the role of the second Croatian foreign minister at the beginning of 1991, 
according to many sources his response to the tempestuous events surround-
ing Croatia’s achievement of independence was not up to the level demanded 
by circumstances.33
In the extensive writings of former Prime Minister Franjo Gregurić (prime 
minister from 2 August 1991 to 12 August 1992), Frane Vinko Golem and his 
work in the Croatian office in Washington are only mentioned sporadically, 
in the briefest notations.34 Thus, “Croatian Government minister and autho-
rized representative of the Croatian Government in the United States, Dr. 
Vinko Golem” reported to the Government on the work of his office. Golem 
warned that “since the U.S. administration only acknowledges official com-
munication, everything directed at the United States should go through the 
Republic of Croatia Foreign Office in Washington D.C.” Based on the propos-
al that “it is necessary to consider the possibility of a representative of Croatia’s 
International Relations Office to visit the U.S. and address the Congressional 
32 Mario Nobilo, op. cit., 266.
33 A positive assessment of Golem as foreign minister was made by Danas reporter Krešo 
Špeletić; citing “outside observers,” he states that the news of Golem’s replacement with Croatian 
American Rudy Perpich was accompanied by the question of “how much sense does it make to 
send an exceptionally dynamic and resourceful minister to the U.S. and simultaneously appoint 
an American to his post, when the former, according to general assessments, has found his 
bearings with uncommon speed and acumen.” Krešo ŠPELETIĆ, “Guverner kao ministar,” 
Danas, 16 Apr. 1991. Some of the controversies surrounding emergent Croatian diplomacy can 
be found in a description of the stay of a Croatian mission in Stuttgart (Baden-Württemberg), 
when unexplained and alleged abduction (!?) of Golem occurred, contained in the memoirs of 
the energy minister at the time, Božo Udovičić. The bizarre scene of the minister’s “abduction” 
took place in front of the hotel in which the Croatian officials were staying (he was pushed into 
a car which drove off in an unspecified direction), and it was reported to the German police by 
the minister’s wife. The first assumptions pertained to the involvement of “Serbs or some secret 
service.” After several hours, Golem returned to the hotel, and the event was never explained 
to Udovičić. The poor organization of this visit was also illustrated in the events surrounding a 
scheduled visit to the parliament of the state of Baden-Württemberg by the Croatian delegation; 
according to Udovičić, when the Croatian ministers, headed by Parliamentary Speaker Žarko 
Domljan, arrived at the parliament building, “nobody was there to receive them, and not even 
the doorman had been informed of their visit.”. See: Božo UDOVIČIĆ, Statisti u demokraciji-
Čitanka za buduću povijest, Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk, 1999, 171-172. These and similar incidents 
demonstrate the level of organization and coordination in Croatian institutions at the begin-
nings of Croatia’s independence.
34 Franjo Gregurić, Vlada demokratskog jedinstva Hrvatske 1991.-1992. (Zagreb: Naklada 
Zadro, 1998), p. 298.
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Foreign Affairs Committee,” one can discern the topics that preoccupy the 
American public.35 This attitude of the Croatia’s top leadership toward the U.S. 
and the restrained stance of the chief of Croatia’s diplomatic mission to the 
U.S. were at odds with the dramatic escalation of the war in Croatia. Frequent 
violence and mass destruction began to attract the attention of the U.S. media 
and this opened the doors for explanations and promotion of Croatia’s posi-
tions in the United States.
Referring to “confidential interviews” in her book from 2004, Višnja 
Starešina also testifies to the work of Golem and the Croatian office from 
July 1991 to the second half of 1992 (when, after Croatia’s recognition by 
the United States, Petar Šarčević arrived as the Croatian ambassador).36 The 
Croatian office should have been a “center that would coordinate information 
and lobbying activities to get the U.S. to recognize Croatia as soon as possible.” 
However, it was opened in a “questionable neighborhood,” and Frane Vinko 
Golem was only joined in his work at the end of 1991 by a graduate student 
from Zagreb and a Croatian American. To meet the needs of lobbying from 
Zagreb, “a low-profile lobbying agency was hired for some laughable fee, for 
which someone in America would not even assent to shine shoes for the con-
tracted period, much less lobby for state interests in high U.S. political circles”; 
Starešina also states that “there were no known results of this lobbying, nor did 
anybody in the Croatian office ever see their Washington lobbyist,” while dip-
lomatic contacts remained “at the most rudimentary level.”37
Nonetheless, Golem tried to attract the attention of the U.S. administration 
and he invested efforts incommensurate with his resources. Due to meager 
funds, ignorance of protocol and conventions and inadequate command of the 
English language, his activities did not represent Croatia properly. With help 
from the Croatian émigré community in the U.S., which attempted to help its 
homeland with great enthusiasm, in August 1991 Frane Vinko Golem orga-
nized a large demonstration of Croats in front of the White House. Starešina 
picturesquely describes his attempts to point out “to Washington the crisis that 
had slid into war” and his striving to encourage “consideration to recognize 
Croatia”: “It was a hot and humid Washington summer, about forty degrees 
Celsius in the shade. The unrecognized Croatian ambassador, the demonstra-
tion’s keynote speaker, did everything he could and endured much to appear 
stately and represent a country as he believed it should be represented. He 
wore a formal black frock coat, in which he, corpulent as he was, perspired in 
the humid weather. He put an ambassadorial sash over it – the symbol of the 
state sent to his delegates by President Tuđman. He wore white tennis shoes 
on his feet, because they were so swollen from the heat that the could not wear 
anything else. This was the image Croatia sent to the world. Tragicomical at 
first glance. But in fact it was so archaic, so maladroit, so ineffective, so trite-
35 Ibid., 298.
36 Višnja Starešina, op. cit., 77-79.
37 Ibid., 78.
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ly childish. Frane Vinko Golem really tried hard, but he was the wrong man in 
the wrong place.”38
Despite the dramatic changes under way in Croatia and Yugoslavia at the 
end of 1991 and beginning of 1992, the situation surrounding Croatia’s rep-
resentation in the United States did not essentially change even later. When 
the United States finally granted recognition to Croatia at the beginning of 
April 1992, the staff of the Croatian office in Washington was notified there-
of by Zagreb. On the same day the United States recognized Slovenia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the latter was also recognized by Croatia on that 
date. Despite this, Golem responded to the news of the Serbian massacre of 
civilians waiting in a bread line in the besieged Bosnian capital Sarajevo, “gen-
uinely distressed but without consulting anyone,” by writing a letter to the U.S. 
Secretary of State for the first time; in a letter that began with the words ‘Dir 
Mister Baker,’ Golem “called attention to events in my country,” forgetting that 
“Bosnia was now another country.”39
According to Starešina, Golem’s associates described him “as an honest, 
simple and above all frugal man,” who was “exceptionally loyal to Tuđman.” 
However, “he knew nothing about diplomacy, nor did anybody tutor him 
prior to his arrival”; “his spoken English was passable, but his writing skills 
were poor.”40 Golem himself made no particular effort to conceal his diplo-
matic shortcomings. His ingenuous attitude toward diplomacy was not well-
accepted by some in the Croatian media. Thus, the weekly Danas mockingly 
cited his statements given to television reporter Damir Matković in the news 
program Slikom na sliku (‘Picture to Picture’). Croatia’s official representative 
in the United States spoke for television “after much calumny” and confirmed 
that he—although the only Croatian representative in Washington—“does not 
have the best command of the language of his new workplace.” The Danas 
reporter accompanied the statement made by the Croatian representative in 
the United States, who “talked about his knowledge of English,” with this jok-
ing commentary: “He revealed something we didn’t known – that Americans 
find broken English pleasing!” Continuing in this tone, the reporter concludes: 
“Unfortunately, it seems that Dr. Golem is suffering from culture shock. He 
sees Americans laughing at him and believes they find him ‘molto simpatico.’ 
Otherwise, so-called broken English is only acceptable if you are speaking to 
Little Joe from Dock 43. But it is no secret that Golem could not even be invit-
ed to one of the most respected American political news programs, McNeil-
Lehrer, because his knowledge of English is below McNeil-Lehrer’s minimum 
standard.”41
To be sure, the work of Frane Vinko Golem and the Croatian office in 




41 “Molto simpatico Golem,” Danas, 28. 4. 1992.
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tary from Croatian Americans as well. Danica Ramljak,42 who actively lob-
bied for Croatia in the United States, commented on the functioning of the 
Croatian office in Washington in a newspaper interview in the spring of 1993: 
“I believe that the office’s chief of staff, Mr. Frane Vinko Golem, had the best 
intentions, but intentions and reality are entirely different things. For example, 
once I wanted to ask him to send me some data I could use for a ‘round table’ 
that I had organized at the Department of Political Science at the University 
of Georgia. He was not in the office, and his clerk informed me that they do 
not have this type of information, directing me to the Ministry of Information 
in Zagreb. But she could not even give me the ministry’s phone number!”43 
Danica Ramljak also noted that “Cyrus Vance received her twice, while he 
never met with Frane Golem,” and she pointed out the poor cooperation with 
Croatia: “Tonči Vrdoljak never sent me a news piece from Croatian Television 
for CNN!”; “After the fall of Vukovar, Ante Beljo could not even manage to 
send at least a few people from that city to the United States to act as witness-
es.”44
Several Croatian Americans, university professors, commented on the 
shortcomings of emerging Croatian diplomacy and the problems of repre-
senting Croatia in the United States during 1991 in the newsmagazine Danas. 
In a text published in August 1991, at the time of the distressing demonstra-
tion of Croats in Washington, Tomislav Sunić and Vladimir P. Goss warned 
that “a year after the establishment of a democratic government in Croatia, the 
Croatian Government is still wanting in its presentation of events in Croatia 
to the international public”; they similarly note that “so far any of the mod-
est victories for Croatia should, paradoxically, be largely credited to the prim-
itivism of Serbian politics and much less to any initiative made by Croatian 
diplomacy.”45 In the United States, “Croatian foreign policy is limping,” and 
the officials who should be representing Croatia are not suitably qualified: 
“It appears as though the Croatian Government is employing a considerable 
number of dilettantes who are, perhaps, capable of writing moving obituaries 
for Croatian historical figure Stjepan Radić, but who, unfortunately, can, with 
the best intentions but rather stupidly, lead Croatia into a political catastro-
phe. Whether we like it or not, Croatia’s state legitimacy is obtained not only 
in Zagreb, but also in Washington and the Quai d’Orsay. A well-qualified staff 
of public relations experts in the United States is much more effective than two 
well-trained divisions in Croatia.”46
42 Danica Ramljak was in the United States at the beginning of the 1990s completing her 
doctoral studies. When the war in Croatia began she began to successfully lobby for the country. 
Later she became a member of the management of the Croatia House, a Croatian American 
organization that promotes Croatian culture.
43 Interview by Rosa Grca with Danica Ramljak, “Sinjanka koja je osvojila Ala Gorea,” Globus, 
15 Mar. 1993.
44 Ibid.
45 Tomislav Sunić, Vladimir P. Goss, “Defanziva,” Danas, 6 Aug. 1991.
46 Ibid.
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As residents of the United States, Sunić and Goss emphasized that “on the 
American political scene, and in formal contacts with the media, it is necessary 
(...) to know how to impose oneself elegantly, rather than wait for foreigners 
to begin crying out that Croatia is threatened on our behalf. Americans love 
the initiative, especially when it is well-formulated. One cannot discount that 
the reason for U.S. unwillingness to recognize Croatia’s independence lies in 
the constant reshuffling of the Croatian Government and in statements made 
by certain Croatian officials that are unacceptable to the language of interna-
tional diplomacy, and particularly for American ‘soft’ politics (...). Impeccable 
knowledge of the American language in all of its finesses and body language 
[author’s note: certainly an allusion to the poor impression left on interloc-
utors by individuals such as Frane Golem or Franjo Tuđman] acceptable to 
Anglo-Saxon ears and eyes are today more important trump cards that the 
Croatian lyrical heart and epic horizons. Something that is obvious to a Croat 
in Croatia need not be obvious to an American.”47
Writing twelve years later on the general problem of communication 
between Croatian politicians and Americans at the beginning of the 1990s, 
Mate Meštrović also made this observation: “I daresay that almost no polit-
ically-involved Croat in the United States, with the possible exception of 
myself, was aware of how to successfully communicate with the Americans. It 
is a matter of different mentalities. This difference was even greater between 
Americans and Croats from the homeland, who grew up in more than a half-
century of communism and seven decades of Yugoslavia. Lack of proficien-
cy in communicating with Americans was immediately apparent among rep-
resentatives of democratic opposition parties, and later those of the Croatian 
authorities, who came to the United States in larger numbers.”48 Meštrović 
shared his views on the problems of Croatian communication with the world 
in 1991 as well. Thus, in an article published in Danas in May 1991 under 
the headline “Croatian catastrophe,” Meštrović harshly criticized Croatian for-
eign policy, obviously prompted by the attitudes of Croatian representatives in 
the United States. He leveled his criticism at “political amateurism and impro-
visation” formulated for the objective of “short-term propaganda effect.”49 
Observing that “over a single year (...) three and half Croatian foreign minis-
ters had come and gone [author’s note: Z. Mršić, F. V. Golem, D. Rudolf and Z. 
Šeparović],” Meštrović warned that “foreign policy has largely (...) consisted of 
President Tuđman traveling around the world.”50
47 Ibid.
48 Mate Meštrović, U vrtlogu hrvatske politike – kazivanje Peri Zlataru (Zagreb: 
Golden marketing, 2003), p. 269. In this context, it is interesting to read Meštrović’s 
view that “one of the rare Croats who knew how to approach the Americans was Slavko 
Goldstein. I became convinced of this at the beginning of 1990 when he arrived with 
Vlado Gotovac as the head of the newly-established Croatian Social-Liberal Party”. 
However, “Goldstein, with his views, diverged not only from those of radical Croatian 
émigrés but also from a large majority of people in the homeland.” Ibid., 269.
49 Mate MEŠTROVIĆ, “Pogled iz Amerike-Hrvatska katastrofa,” Danas, 14 May 1991.
50 Ibid.
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Due to this critical observations, in which he also mentioned the state’s 
top leadership, Meštrović was fiercely criticized in a response printed in the 
very next issue of Danas, in an article under the headline “Indulgence of an 
Americanized Croat.”51 In this article, Meštrović’s critic states that “in sever-
al recent articles that we have all read, Meštrović demonstrates a deep-seated 
lack of understanding for the fates of ordinary Croats who have been thrust 
into the grindstone of potent historical forces, and then thoroughly pulverized 
and discarded”; the author ask “whether it is possible that Meštrović has suc-
cumbed to a stereotype when speaking of communists? Perhaps he was think-
ing otherwise, but he wrote that the communist authorities were only formally 
overthrown in the first Croatian elections and that they are actually in power 
and sharing in the spoils of victory. So to him the new authorities are undem-
ocratic and corrupt. His opinion of Croatian freedom fighters in exile is just 
as poor. He himself, as opposed to the views of ordinary people, illustrated his 
stance in the case of Bruno Bušić. Americans, Meštrović writes as a genuine 
American, believe that airline hijackers—and one of their principle ideologues 
was Bruno Bušić—are terrorists who have to be prosecuted as such (...) With 
these examples, Meštrović wants to expose urbi et orbi the structure of the 
Croatian Democratic Union and the structure of the new authorities, which to 
him are Bolshevik and Ustasha.”52
Elements of day-to-day politics but also major differences in the political 
and cultural standpoints of “America” and “Croatia” are notable in the argu-
ments of Meštrović’s critics. Meštrović’s views on the need to create a govern-
ment of “national salvation” that would “consist of the most qualified people of 
all political orientations in Croatia” together with the establishment of a gov-
ernment “that will have the genuine authority to make decisions and formu-
late Croatian policies together with the Croatian Parliament” ensued from his 
calls for reinforcement of democracy in Croatia.53 Meštrović did not limit the 
establishment of Croatia’s freedom and democratization to Croatia alone, rath-
er he saw the need for “a just solution to the national conflict in Yugoslavia” 
(“which cannot be achieved unless everybody is equally involved in talks, 
meaning the Albanians and Muslims, Hungarians and others”). Meštrović’s 
theory of the maintenance of “one-party rule” in Croatia even after the intro-
duction of political pluralism, his demand for an end to “narrow-minded par-
tisan politicking in Croatia” and his calls for new elections and new electoral 
legislation were met with hostility among top Croatian officials because they 
51 Mate Marsin, “Popustljivost amerikaniziranog Hrvata,” Danas, 21 May 1991.
52 Ibid. Meštrović’s confrontations with the Croatian authorities go back to the pre-election 
period, which can certainly, at least partly, explain his uncompromising criticism. After join-
ing the National Accord Coalition (rather than the Croatian Democratic Union/HDZ) in the 
1990 elections and supporting moderate stances pertaining to the dissociation of Yugoslavia, 
Meštrović came into full frontal conflict with the HDZ. In April 1990, President Tuđman reject-
ed a proposal by politician Dražen Budiša that Meštrović be appointed Croatia’s representa-
tive to the United Nations, despite his experience and flawless knowledge of English. See: Mate 
Meštrović, op. cit., 320.
53 Mate Meštrović, “Pogled iz Amerike-Hrvatska katastrofa,” Danas, 14 May 1991.
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impinged upon the integrity of the president, the governing party (Croatian 
Democratic Union) and the state leadership.54 Other contributions by Croatian 
Americans—for example, letters to the editor published in Danas—indicated 
the differences between American and Croatian cultural and political para-
digms. Thus, for example, President Tuđman was the butt of their criticism for 
his purchase of a jet aircraft with funds donated by émigrés and his tendency 
to create a cult of personality (“Does Croatia need another Tito?”); they criti-
cized the ethnocentrism of individual Croatian officials (e.g. statements such 
as “only someone whose father and mother are Croats can be a good Croat”) 
and they criticized government moves such as opening debate on the renova-
tion and future function of the medieval Medvedgrad fortress on the moun-
tain above Zagreb (‘Altar of the Homeland’) in light of more pressing events in 
Croatia (“Medvedgrad and Vukovar”).55
A brief interview granted to the weekly Danas by theology professor Petar 
Kuzmić from Boston also contained recognizable themes that most often char-
acterized critical overviews of Croatian actions in the United States. “Croatia 
has lost the media war. ‘How are we portrayed in the American media?’ – that 
was what they asked me in Osijek last week for Croatian Television. ‘Quite 
poorly, I mean, not at all...’ I refrained from elaborating because they told 
us Croatia shouldn’t be criticized while its blood is being shed... Generally I 
agree... but perhaps less blood would have been shed if we had subjected cer-
tain careless moves and euphorically conveyed shallow speeches and state-
ments to critical scrutiny... ‘You’re poorly represented in Washington,’ a U.S. 
congressman otherwise fond of Croatia told me last week. This was confirmed 
by others from the media and friends as well. ‘You’re represented by a man 
who does not know enough English, who has no strategy to promote Croatia 
and who doesn’t know how to articulate your pain and suffering...’ I immedi-
ately reported this to my friends in Zagreb and Osijek, who personally told the 
Croatian president that we need a more capable representative in Washington. 
Nothing helped. In mid-December I once more informed President Tuđman 
of this severe defect of Croatian diplomacy. He asked me why the United 
States does not support us. I agreed with him that we have many enemies of 
Croatia in America, such as Mr. Eagleburger, a strong Serbian lobby, high-pro-
file Congresswoman Helen Delich-Bentley, the financially and informative-
ly biased CNN and others, but that we largely had ourselves to blame because 
we were working to our own detriment. In America elections and wars are 
won and/or lost in the media. We lost ours because we were represented in 
diplomacy and the media by a man who is by nature and profession alleged-
ly good, but who is entirely illiterate in these two key fields. He doesn’t know 
anything himself, but will not give others the opportunity. He classifies Croats 
54 Ibid.
55 See: Dr. Slavko Knežević, “Cincinnati, Oh, USA, Tuđmanov avion-Kada lete predsjednici,” 
Danas, 2 June 1992; Tomislav Nagy, “River Forest, USA, Dobri Hrvati-Neukusna izjava,” Danas, 
26 May 1992; Stjepan Boričević, “Chicago, Medvedgrad i Vukovar,” Danas, 24 Mar. 1992.
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into those who have money and merit because they helped the governing 
party, and those who, albeit perhaps the most patriotic and the most clever, 
but who are nonetheless ‘morally and politically unsuitable.’ All of America 
knows about this, but one-party Zagreb has remained deaf (and mute) for an 
entire year. Perhaps it is a matter of a third thing – which everyone is talking 
about – but about which my Christian pen cannot write!”56
Kuzmić’s frequent criticism, of which some were directly aimed at Frane 
Vinko Golem, were answered in Danas by Croatia’s representative in the U.S. 
himself, saying that “without any detailed analysis and lacking any factual cita-
tions (...), I was brutally slandered and insulted” by Kuzmić.57 Nevertheless, he 
acknowledged that “Croatia was poorly portrayed in the media in the United 
States” and that “what little there was, was (...) at odds with Croatia and its 
entire leadership”; however, he stressed that since “the opening of the Office 
in Washington (8 July 1991), the situation had gradually but surely began 
changing to Croatia’s benefit, and the opposing side frequently complained 
to American media outlets that they favor Croatia.” To this he added a list of 
American senators and congressmen with whom contacts had been set up by 
the Croatian office.58
Even though he was a persona non grata to the governing HDZ, Mate 
Meštrović was contacted for assistance in the U.S. by many Croatian offi-
cials during 1991 and 1992. Prior to the arrival of Foreign Minister Zvonko 
Šeparović to the U.S., Meštrović was asked to set up a meeting with U.S. offi-
cials.59 Even on this occasion, ignorance of American protocols and conven-
tions came to the forefront. Not without some bitterness, Meštrović testified 
to these “double standards”: “Despite mistrust of me, the Croatian authori-
ties continued to ask me for favors. (...) Yesterday they called me from Zagreb. 
Minister Zvonimir Šeparović was coming again, so they asked me to arrange 
a meeting with James Baker, Bush’s Secretary of State. I’m not sure who they 
think they are. They obviously think I can ring Baker and schedule a meet-
ing with Šeparović just like that. When they need me, they seek my assistance 
urgently. When they don’t need me, they denounce me as a CIA agent and a 
traitor to the Croatian people …”60
56 Davor Glavaš, “Nobelova nagrada za Cyrusa Vancea,” Danas, 10 Mar. 1992. See also: Petar 
Kuzmić, “Zahvalnost bez oduševljenja,” Danas, 14 Apr. 1992; Petar Kuzmić, “Popaljeni olimpi-
jski gradovi,” Danas, 12 May 1992; Petar KUZMIĆ, “Došlo im do mozga,” Danas, 2 June 1992.
57 Frane Golem, “Držite se Biblije,” Danas, 14 Apr. 1992.
58 Ibid.
59 Zvonko Šeparović was foreign minister in the so-called Government of National Unity led 
by Prime Minister Franjo Gregurić from 31 July 1991 to 27 May 1992 (he replaced Davorin 
Rudolf at this post). Šeparović traveled to the U.S. three times as minister. On this see: Davor 
Ivanković: “Intervju sa Zvonimirom Šeparovićem - Kako smo (s)lomili čuvare Jugoslavije,” 
Slobodna Dalmacija, 28, 29 & 30 May 1994.
60 Mate Meštrović, op. cit., 320.
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Meštrović also states that even “before (...) I had unpleasant experiences 
when arranging Šeparović’s meetings with Americans”: “When he arrived in 
the U.S. the first time as foreign minister, I arranged a meeting with the edi-
torial board of The New York Times. This paper, not without reason, is con-
sidered almost as influential as the White House. After a series of phone calls, 
and intervention by friends, I managed to set up a meeting for Šeparović with 
The New York Times. But then he cancelled at the last minute, saying he had 
more important obligations. This flippant gesture on his part angered the oth-
erwise busy editors, and certainly ensured that their already negative views of 
Croatian officials became even poorer. I was puzzled that Zvonimir Šeparović 
was not aware of the immeasurable influence of this paper in the United States. 
Perhaps he thought he could treat them like a man in high authority, the way 
they treated reporters from Vjesnik or Večernji list in Croatia!”61
In an analysis entitled “Legend-Induced Paranoia of the Serbs and Hits 
and Myths of the Croats,” contained in his book Anatomy of Deceit,62 Jerry 
Blaskovich, an American physician of Croatian descent, shared some exhaus-
tive and fascinating observations on the specific causes of Croatia’s misunder-
standing of the American political milieu and media at the beginning of the 
1990s. He noticed that the attention of the international public concentrated 
on Croatia “from the moment the Serbs unleashed their onslaught on Croatia,” 
and this resulted in the appearance of many pundits, reporters and authors 
of the most diverse backgrounds who “offered highly speculative and suspect 
opinions” on the Yugoslav crisis. He notes they “persistently pontificated that 
regional history was the exclusive genesis of today’s conflicts, without accurate-
ly understanding that history. So they’ve invariably recounted Serbian mythol-
ogies instead.”63
Under circumstances marked by media concentration on Croatia, there was 
room for Croatian interpretations of events as well. Blaskovich provides broad 
observations of Croatia’s lack of readiness to confront these challenges. Here 
he dedicates considerable attention to Croatia’s counter-productive attempts 
to explain the complicated historical background of the Yugoslav conflicts. 
Although speaking in general terms, it is not difficult to discern criticism that 
applies (and probably pertains to) the rhetoric of President Tuđman: “To the 
detriment of more important priorities, the Croats have spent a great deal of 
energy trying to set the record straight. In the process, they’ve gotten caught in 
the trap of quoting their own history ad nauseam. The Croats felt that history 
was on their side and once the world learned the real truth, in contrast to the 
Serbian version, everything would miraculously fall into place for Croatia.” He 
goes on to observe: “Instead of discussing the contemporary political situation, 
most Croatian government representatives spent all their time trying to decon-
61 Ibid., 320.
62 Jerry Blaskovich, Anatomy of Deceit (New York: Dunhill Publishing, 1997). At the behest of 
the J.P. Mackley, head of the Foreign Press Bureau in Zagreb, Blaskovich traveled to Croatia in 
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struct the Serbian take on Croatia’s past. Croatian spokesmen didn’t compre-
hend that the attention span of their audiences started to drift as soon as they 
brought up the Croats’ significance during the time of Christ’s birth. By the 
time the spokesmen reached the seventh century, when the Croats finally set-
tled in the Balkans, they had lost their audiences completely. Croatian officials 
never reached the point where they could articulate the real issues and Croatia’s 
present agenda because they spent all of their energy explaining history.”64
Historical interpretations of practical political matters were particularly prob-
lematic for pragmatic Americans: “…Croatia’s representative to Washington, 
Franjo [sic] Golem, always thought the answer to an American legislator’s 
question, ‘What can we or what do you want us to do for Croatia?’ was carte 
blanche to deliver a lesson on Croatian history. One leading congressman told 
me that he dreaded having to meet with Golem, but did so because of protocol. 
He described these meetings as analogous to asking someone for the time and 
receiving a lecture on how to make a clock instead.”65
The only “protagonist” from the territory of the former Yugoslavia that did 
not utilize a “version of history to embellish their own agendas” were, accord-
ing to Blaskovich, the Slovenes. Blaskovich concludes his review on the role 
of history in the diplomatic activities of the warring peoples with a comment 
that reflects the views of an American who, even though Croatian by descent, 
provides an “American” portrayal the political culture of his people of origin: 
“Whether that history was credible was of least importance. For a long time 
we were bombarded with the ‘Loony Tunes’ Serbian version because it was the 
only one used by Western leaders and the media. But I have no doubt that 
because of the decisive Croatian military victories in 1995 we’ll soon be inun-
dated with the Croatian ‘Merry Melodies’.”66
The “progenitor” of the approach based on proving “the historical right” in 
which historical interpretations played a vital role was President Tuđman him-
self, who represented Croatia to the largest degree.67 During a visit by foreign 
reporters, President Tuđman “patiently and exhaustively recounted a histori-
cal and scholarly interpretation of the roots of the Croatian-Serbian conflict, 
the pedigree of Croatian statehood, culture and identity and his views on the 
future of this part of Europe and the European continent as a whole. Foreign 
reporters did not like Tuđman because he seemed morose, close-minded and 
outmoded with his ‘fanatical historicism,’ but they came to him persistently in 
increasingly larger groups, because their professional instincts told them that 
something major and bloody was about to happen. The president rejected any 
instruction on press relations, zealously adhering to his historical approach, 
to which diplomats and journalists either did not respond or among whom 
64 Ibid., 13.
65 Jerry Blaskovich, op. cit., 13.
66 Ibid., 13.
67 Gordana Uzelak, “Franjo Tudjman’s Nationalist Ideology,” East European Quarterly, Volume 
XXXI, Number 4, Winter 1997, p. 451. Based on an analysis of Tuđman’s rhetoric in fifty articles 
containing his statements, Uzelak came upon the term ‘history,’ in various contexts and mean-
ings, 35 times.
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it provoked concealed laughter.”68 However, one of the most influential inter-
national authorities on Yugoslav history, Ivo Banac, who has been one of the 
most strident critics of Tuđman’s policies since 1992, has an exceptionally poor 
opinion of Tuđman, not just as a politician, but also as a historian.69
Many years later, Ante Čuvalo from Chicago made similar observations at 
an international seminar, “about how Americans who deal with our problems, 
look at or looked at Yugoslavia”; among other things, Čuvalo stressed: “Too 
much is said about the Balkans and local matters, so don’t be surprised when 
a reporter, expert or sub-expert on this part of the world comes home and 
writes that we live solely off of history here. Many of them do not understand 
this.”70
The justification for objections raised by Croatian Americans and other 
qualified observers of the weaknesses of Croatian policies vis-à-vis the United 
States and the world in general is reflected in a study of foreign receptions of 
Croatia and the (post)Yugoslav territory and the manner in which the inter-
national community responded to Yugoslavia’s collapse. In a synthetic over-
view of analyses of various “crisis management models”—applied by the great 
powers and international organizations in the Yugoslavia case—American his-
torian James Sadkovich critically examines an indicative example of consid-
eration of the Yugoslav conflict that was unfavorable for Croatia. Sadkovich 
states that individual foreign interpreters of (post)Yugoslav circumstances 
“committed grave errors in citing the facts and making conclusions that they 
could not defend”; thus the “Serbs in Croatia are portrayed as insurgents and 
the role of the JNA and Serbian propaganda in initiating, supplying, training 
and supporting the Croatian Serbs is ignored. Instead, they stress Tuđman’s 
use of ‘Ustasha symbols’ as an evocation of ‘memories of past crimes’ of Croats 
against Serbs. Because they saw the conflict as a ‘civil war,’ they believed that it 
was a ‘bafflingly complicated’ and ‘irredentist conflict’ in which ‘kaleidoscop-
ically changing alliances’ at the local and national levels make it difficult to 
discern who holds the power. The authors of the analysis saw the Bosnians as 
‘Muslim Serbs,’ Yugoslav history as dark and violent, everyone was proclaimed 
equally culpable of cease-fire violations, Germany as the driver of the EU, the 
‘early recognition’ of Bosnia as an obstacle to the formation of a sustainable 
federation, and they ultimately condemned the U.S. for undermining the EU 
and UN peace efforts, the frustration of negotiators such as David Owen, the 
provocation of the Serbs and encouragement of the Muslims.”71
68 Mario Nobilo, op. cit., 108.
69 Ivo Banac, “Krv nije država-Kako je Tuđman krivotvorio povijest hrvatske nacionalne 
integracije,” Feral Tribune, 26 Dec. 1994. See also the interview by Tatjana TAGIROV with Ivo 
Banac in Arkzin (no date – author’s personal photo-copy). For an assessment of Tuđman as a 
historian, see also: Vladimir đuro Degan, Hrvatska država u međunarodnoj zajednici (Zagreb: 
Nakladni zavod Globus, 2002), p. 267.
70 Međunarodni znanstveni skup “Jugoistočna Europa 1918.-1995.” – Dubrovnik, 23-25 May 
1996 (Zagreb: Hrvatski informativni centar, 2000), p. 195.
71 James Sadkovich, “Klimavi početak: Što možemo naučiti iz raspad Jugoslavije?” Polemos 2, 
(Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk, 1999), p. 156. 
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Certainly this comment (as one of many) prompts the basic question of 
the level of accountability of the protagonists in the Yugoslav conflicts and 
the (co)responsibility of international community “factors.” It remains an 
open question as to what Croatia could have objectively done to improve its 
image in the world given the circumstances: an imposed war and the unwill-
ingness of the international community to stop the escalating conflict. The 
example of Slovenia, which made optimum media use of the invasion of the 
Yugoslav People’s Army during its “ten-day war,” shows that the negative 
image of “nationalist separatists” can be turned into the notion of a “David 
vs. Goliath” confrontation overnight. While Yugoslav Army tanks lumbered 
down Slovenia’s roads and its warplanes with their red star insignia strafed its 
citizens (the most effective footage was nevertheless shot at the border cross-
ing with Austria, where Turkish truck drivers were largely the victims of air 
strikes), Ljubljana Television alternated images of the JNA aggression with 
scenes of Soviet tanks entering Prague in 1968. The response by the interna-
tional public was not long in coming. Even though Croatia was in a radical-
ly different position than Slovenia (geopolitical position, rebel Serbs, repri-
sals going back to the Second World War, etc.), the observations of Croatian 
Americans confirm the stance that emerging Croatian foreign policy did not 
choose the best approach to promoting Croatia’s interests abroad.
Commenting on the problems surrounding Croatia’s initial forays into for-
eign affairs, Mate Meštrović concludes: “The extent of Tuđman’s understand-
ing the soul of our people and success in mobilizing them in the struggle for 
independence was matched by his inaptitude in contacts with the internation-
al community. And his envoys who came to the United States before the first 
democratic elections, and afterward, proved no more adept in their contacts 
with Washington and the American public.”72 Višnja Starešina also observed 
the poor organization of Croatian diplomacy in the United States and other 
important world centers in 1991 and the beginning of 1992: “Many Croatian 
politicians solemnly departed for so-called lobbying tours of European capi-
tals, later characterizing them as their great contributions to recognition: they 
recounted the talks they held in the British Foreign Office, or what they said in 
the Quai d’Orsay. The impressions that they left were not, in fact, so brilliant. 
For example, Croatian émigrés in the United States who helped arrange meet-
ings between Croatian politicians and even ministers and major officials from 
the U.S. administration were often astounded when they saw that all these 
Croatian ‘political lobbyists’ wanted was to be photographed with an ‘impor-
tant person’ and then – leave. No talks! Later they realized the reasons for such 
photo opportunities, when they saw ‘mission accomplished’ photos in the 
Croatian press. This was a typical Croatian stunt. The main goal of diplomatic 
and lobbying efforts were to provide the Croatian public and Tuđman ‘proof ’ 
of their own successful efforts. To show off for the domestic audience.”73
72 Mate Meštrović, op. cit., 276.
73 Višnja Starešina, op. cit. 81.
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Conclusion:
The public commentary by Croatian American intellectuals at the begin-
ning of the 1990s was characterized by the dual Croatian-American per-
spective of observation, wherein (Croatian) patriotic feelings and the direct 
and open (“American”) approach to the problem of Croatia’s position in the 
United States and the world became intertwined. Criticism of the U.S. stance 
was increasingly accompanied by a tendency to more harshly criticize the 
Croatian authorities. This latter tendency deepened in the subsequent peri-
od, primarily because of the negative reception of Croatian policies toward 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian authorities (especially President Tuđman) 
first ignored but then confronted a portion of the Croatian American intelli-
gentsia, and this served as a vital indicator of misunderstanding, not just of the 
importance of incorporating the highest quality persons from Croatian émi-
gré communities in the struggle for Croatia’s status in the United States and 
the world, but also of the American political milieu as a whole. The central 
themes of this confrontation during the period covered by this work pertain to 
criticism of the “partisan” approach to setting up diplomatic structures in the 
United States, wherein the most qualified members of the Croatian American 
intellectual elite, who were very familiar with American circumstances and 
institutions, were neglected.
This miscalculation by the Croatian authorities during this period primar-
ily manifested itself in media and lobbying fiascoes. However, the more sig-
nificant consequences of the failure to include, or even the outright margin-
alization, of Croatian Americans (and many other eminent Croatian émigré 
intellectuals such as Jakša Kušan, Chris Cviić, Neven Šimac or Tihomil Radja) 
were, over the long term, reflected in the problems of democratic and eco-
nomic development. Croatia’s official policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
absence of growth of civil society (which did not adequately accompany the 
process of national emancipation) and the problematic “economic transfor-
mation” resulted in a burgeoning deficit of democracy that was already, and 
frequently, observed by Croatian Americans at the beginning of the 1990s.
From the second half of 1992 until President Tuđman’s death in 1999, rela-
tions between Croatia and the United States were generally strained, despite 
close political cooperation and military alliance in 1994-1995 (from the 
Washington Agreement to the Dayton Accords). One of the best-informed 
experts on the attitude of the U.S. media (public and politics) to the collapse of 
Yugoslavia and Croatia, the author of the book The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, 
1991-1995, historian James J. Sadkovich (also of partial Croatian descent), 
made the following observation in 1997: “In a word, President Tuđman has a 
poor image because he hasn’t changed for the better. He is often portrayed as a 
rigid personality, rooted in nationalist ideology and a party that wants to reju-
venate the Ustasha state and its symbols.”74
74 Bartol Letica, “Slavenka Drakulić najutjecajnija je hrvatska novinarka u Americi!,” Globus, 
4 July 1997.
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Regardless of their different political backgrounds, most critically-orient-
ed Croatian Americans agreed about the importance of Croatia’s democratic 
and economic development, where relations between Croatia and the United 
States were seen as vitally important, especially in the first half of the 1990s. 
In this sense, the question of understanding and establishment of a dialogue 
between the Croatian authorities and that segment of the émigré community 
and the latter’s potential active involvement in social processes and Croatia’s 
affirmation in the U.S. and the world in general was exceptionally important 
to the development of Croatian-U.S. relations during the 1990s. The signif-
icant involvement in Croatia’s public life by intellectuals whose views on life 
and politics were formed in a country that was for many Croats at the begin-
ning of the 1990s the “world’s top democracy,” heralded the historical possi-
bility of accelerating the process of overcoming stagnant one-party intellectual 
uniformity and a heritage of historical controversies and adopting the precepts 
of democratic culture. In mid-December 1992, Ivo Banac made the following 
point at the Assembly of the cultural and literary association Matica Hrvatska: 
“I am at liberty to say that Croatian Americans, particularly our intelligentsia, 
see the culture of openness and freedom, the culture of truth and democracy, 
as the only real option…”75 In May 1995, similar sentiments were expressed by 
Ante Čuvalo: “I believe Croatia has no choice. Croatia must create a democrat-
ic legal and economic system – the sooner, the better.”76
Translated by Edward Bosnar
75 Pozdravna riječ na Saboru Matice Hrvatske, 19 Dec. 1992; See: Ivo BANAC, Cijena Bosne 
(Zagreb: Europa danas, 1994), p. 46.
76 Međunarodni znanstveni skup “Jugoistočna Europa 1918.-1995.” – Dubrovnik, 23-
25 May 1996 (Zagreb: Hrvatski informativni centar, 2000), p. 194.
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KISS: Keep It Simple, Stupid!
Kritische Bemerkungen von kroatischen Intellektuellen in Amerika wäh-
rend der Herstellung politischer Beziehungen zwischen Kroatien und den 
Vereinigten Staaten, 1990-1992
Zusammenfassung
Mit der Internationalisierung  der jugoslawischen Krise in der zweiten Hälfte des 
Jahre 1990 und in 1991 beginnt sich Kroatien  als selbstständiger Akteur der internation-
alen Politik zu behaupten. In diesem geschichtlichen Kontext drängte sich das Problem 
der institutionellen Vorstellung der kroatischen Interessen und Ziele im Ausland auf. 
Ende 1990 und Anfang 1991 kommt es zur Verschärfung der Beziehungen zwischen 
den pro-demokratisch orientierten Teilrepubliken Slowenien und Kroatien einerseits 
und Slobodan Milošević andererseits, der eine immer größer werdende Zuneigung 
von JNA (Jugoslawische Volksarmee) gewinnt.  Durch die Verkündung der staatlichen 
Souveränität und Initiierung des Verfahrens der Auflösung von Jugoslawien am 25. 
Juni 1991 wurde eine neue Phase der jugoslawischen Krise eröffnet. Nach Angriff der 
JNA auf Slowenien, der von kurzer Dauer war, und nach Aggression auf Kroatien, die 
danach erfolgte, wird die internationale  Propaganda zu einem wichtigen Bestandteil 
des kroatischen Befreiungskrieges und des diplomatischen Kampfes um internatio-
nale Anerkennung der staatlichen Souveränität.
Laut Erwartungen der Akteure des Zerfalls von Jugoslawien sollten die Vereinigten 
Staaten die bedeutendste Rolle in diesem Prozess spielen. Während Slowenien und 
Kroatien  vergeblich die Hilfe für die Realisierung ihrer Anforderungen nach demok-
ratischen Reformen und Dezentralisierung Jugoslawiens erwarteten, fürchteten sich 
Milošević und JNA genauso unberechtigt vor amerikanischem Eingriff.  Die USA 
unterstützen formell den Regierungschef Marković und sein Reformpaket, aber in der 
Praxis distanzieren sie sich allmählich von der aktiven Teilnahme an der jugoslawischen 
Krise. Nachdem Staatssekretär James Baker Anfang Juni 1991 Belgrad besuchte und 
nach dem Eingriff von JNA auf Slowenien, der gleich danach erfolgte, ziehen sich 
die USA aus Jugoslawien zurück, indem sie die Initiative für Kriegsbeendigung der 
Europäischen Union überlassen. Trotz Equidistanz verfolgen die USA aufmerksam die 
Ereignisse in Kroatien und revidieren allmählich ihre Standpunkte, wobei hinsichtlich 
ihres globalen Einflusses, eine bedeutende Rolle die einflussreichsten amerikanischen 
Medien spielen. Mit der Anerkennung von Kroatien, Slowenien und Bosnien und 
Herzegowina Anfang April 1992 beginnen die USA allmählich sich aktiver gegenüber 
den Kriegsereignissen auf dem Balkan zu bestimmen, deren Fokus sich in der zweiten 
Hälfte 1992 nach Bosnien und Herzegowina verlegt.
Im ganzen Zeitraum, beginnend mit den demokratischen Verwandlungen 1990 bis 
zur internationalen Anerkennung 1992, war von außerordentlicher Bedeutung für das 
Fortbestehen Kroatiens und seine Affirmation in der internationalen Gemeinschaft 
die Frage nach erfolgreicher Legitimierung seiner Interessen. In Zusammenhang 
damit taucht die Problematik der Einbindung der kroatischen Emigration auf, ins-
besondere der hoch gebildeten Intelligenz, in die Vertretung  kroatischer Interessen. 
Die kroatische Emigration spielte zweifellos eine bedeutende Rolle bei materieller 
Hilfeleistung, die von außerordentlicher Bedeutung für einen erfolgreichen Widerstand 
der serbischen Aggression war. Wenn aber vom intellektuellen Potenzial die Rede ist, 
in erster Linie in Ländern, die wie die USA von großer Bedeutung waren, bleibt die 
kroatische Intelligenz unter den Auswanderern  bei Schaffung der Diplomatie und 
Gestaltung der Außenpolitik irgendwie am Rande. 
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Diese Arbeit verfolgt das Verhältnis der Schaffung der kroatischen Diplomatie 
in den USA und öffentlicher Auftritte amerikanischer Kroaten, die von einer ganz 
bestimmten Zielgruppe repräsentiert werden, und zwar von den Intellektuellen; in 
erster Linie handelt es sich um hoch gebildete Leute mit akademischem Doktorgrad 
und Universitätsprofessoren. Mit ihren kritischen Bemerkungen in Medien weist die 
kroatisch-amerikanische Intelligenz auf das Problem öffentlicher Auftritte in den 
USA hin und auf das Bedürfnis nach dem Lobbyieren, das für die amerikanischen 
Verhältnisse geeignet wäre. Es wird die Bereitschaft ausgedrückt, sich aktiv in 
Einbindung und Vertretung kroatischer Interessen einzugliedern. Die amerikanischen 
Kroaten machen sich sowohl um den erfolgreichen Widerstand  der großserbischen 
Aggression verdienstlich als auch um die Anerkennung der staatlichen Souveränität, 
aber genauso weisen sie auf die Notwendigkeit der Promovierung pluralistischer 
Werte und der Entwicklung der Demokratie in Kroatien hin. Mit Rücksicht auf die 
anspruchsvolle Aufgabe des Ausbaus eines diplomatischen Netzes, Kriegsumstände, 
aber auch auf den Mangel politischer Kultur der Offenheit, nutzte die neue poli-
tische Elite in Kroatien  nicht auf die beste Art und Weise das kroatische intellektuelle 
Potenzial in Amerika.  “Doppelte” Perspektive der Intelligenz aus den Reihen ameri-
kanischer Kroaten wurde Anfang der 90-er Jahre nicht auf die beste Art und Weise 
für die Positionierung Kroatiens in den USA ausgenutzt; genauso wurde eine aktivere 
Einbindung der amerikanischen Emigrationsintelligenz in die Demokratisierung der 
kroatischen Gesellschaft verpasst, was erhebliche Auswirkungen  auf die spätere inter-
nationale Lage Kroatiens zur Folge hatte. 
